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as long-term capital gains and losses rather than as gains
and losses from the sale of capital assets. S. Rpt. No.
169, Vol. 1, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 498, April 2, 1984.
Second, § 1231(a) prescribes capital treatment of
certain gains for other purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code despite the absence of the term “capital asset.” For
example, § 1221 generally limits the deduction of losses
from the sale or exchange of capital assets to the gains
from such sales or exchanges. In applying the limitation,
however, taxpayers may reduce § 1231(a) gains treated
as capital gains by losses from the sale of capital assets.
See Form 4797 and Schedule D of Form 1040. See also
Rev. Rul. 76-70, 1976-1 C.B. 225.
The difference in language between § 1231(a) and §
1222(9) may cause some confusion. The language
contained in § 1231(a) refers to treating the gains and
losses as long-term capital gains or long-term capital
losses, while the language of § 1222(9) refers to capital
gain net income as the excess of gains from the sales or
exchanges of capital assets over such losses. We
believe, however, that the language difference is of little
consequence.
In addition, a question arises whether the purpose of
the amendment made to § 32 by the 1996 Act would be
fully implemented if gains treated under § 1231(a) as
long-term capital gains were not included in the
definition of disqualified income. The reason for adding
the provision to the definition of “disqualified income”
is set forth in the House Report underlying the proposed
House bill. The Report states:
“The committee believes that individuals with
substantial assets could use proceeds from the sale
of those assets in place of the earned income credit
to support consumption in times of low income. . .
(I)n order to apply a proxy for an asset-based test,
the recently enacted disqualified income test
concentrates on the returns generated by those
assets. . .. The committee believes that net capital
gains and other passive income represent other
flows of income from assets that could be
liquidated to support current consumption.”
Accordingly, based on the above, if a dairy farmer
has net gain from any taxable year from the sale of §
1231 assets, including the sale of dairy cows, held for at
least 24 months, such gains are treated as long-term
capital gains by operation of the legal requirements set
forth in § 1231. Thus, such gains properly are taken into
account in determining the dairy farmer’s capital gain
net income under § 1222 for the taxable year. Under §
32, if the farmer’s aggregate amount of disqualified
income for the taxable year, including capital gain net
income, exceeds $2,200, that farmer is not eligible to
receive the earned income tax credit under the
amendments made to § 32 by the 1996 Act. . . .
Sincerely,
Lewis J. Fernandez
Deputy Assistant Chief Counsel
(Income Tax and Accounting)
Commentary by Neil E. Harl:
I disagree with the Treasury’s analysis of the law. In
their view, income from Section 1231 gain is included
in the calculation because gains from Section 1231
assets are treated as capital gains. That conclusion is
reached despite the clear statutory message that Section
1231 assets are not capital assets.
As noted in my article, “Farmers and the Earned
Income Credit,” 8 Agricultural Law Digest 41 (1997),
“capital gain net income” was added in 1996 to
“disqualified income.” The statute states that “capital
gain net income” is to have the meaning given the term
in Section 1222 of the Internal Revenue Code.  Section
1222 defines “capital gain net income” as “the excess of
the gains from sales or exchanges of capital assets over
the losses from such sales or exchanges.” Section 1221
defines “capital assets” as all assets except for five
enumerated categories of asset. Section 1221(2)
specifically excludes from the definition of capital asset,
assets used in the trade or business under I.R.C. § 1231.
I would hope that the Treasury would reconsider its
interpretation of the Code section involved and reach
what I believe is the correct conclusion, that gains from
Section 1231 assets are not included in “disqualified
income.”
Unless the Treasury reconsiders, the focus will be on
a statutory solution to the problem. Although I do not
believe that an amendment is necessary, I.R.C. § 32
should be amended to make it absolutely crystal clear
that gains from Section 1231 assets are not to be
included in “capital gain net income.”
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor had filed for
Chapter 7 in September 1993 and in October 1993, the
state of Illinois filed a complaint under the state
Environmental Protection Act against the debtor as a
shareholder in a agricultural chemical corporation which
had made alleged violations of the Act. The state court
action included requests for civil penalties, an injunction
and litigation costs. The state filed claims in the debtor’s
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bankruptcy case for investigation costs. The state court
action was eventually dismissed because of the
bankruptcy case and because the state determined that
the violations had been removed. The debtor sought
sanctions against the state for failure to cease
prosecution of the state court case after the filing of the
bankruptcy case. The court held that the state case was
within the exception of Section 362(b)(4) for actions by
a governmental unit to enforce its police powers. In re
Mateer, 205 B.R. 915 (C.D. Ill. 1997).
MODIFICATION OF PLAN. The debtor’s
Chapter 11 plan provided for full payment of a secured
claim with a production credit association. At the time
of the plan confirmation, the PCA provided interest
rates based on alphabetic classification of the loan. The
Chapter 11 plan provided for interest on the plan
payments to the PCA at one of these classifications but
also provided that the interest rate could change from
time to time. Shortly after the plan payments began, the
PCA eliminated the alphabetical loan classification. The
PCA then announced an increase in the interest rate for
the debtor’s loan. The debtor sought a bankruptcy court
determination as to the reasonableness of the interest
rate under the plan. The District Court dismissed the
action, holding that the Bankruptcy Court had no
jurisdiction over the plan because the plan was clear and
unambiguous when confirmed and provided for changes
in the interest rate. The appellate court confirmed. In re
Heine Feedlot Co., 107 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 1997).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The debtor was a
corporation which operated a car sales business. IRS
agents visited the debtor’s premises and executed
against the debtor’s inventory. While the execution was
in progress, the debtor filed for bankruptcy but the IRS
did not cease the execution.. The debtor sought damages
for the IRS violation of the automatic stay, under
Sections 362(h) and 105. The IRS sought a summary
judgment on this issue. The court held that relief under
Section 362(h) was not available to the debtor because
the debtor was not an individual debtor. However, the
court held that summary judgment for the IRS was not
appropriate because the court had sufficient authority
under Section 105 to award damages and an issue of
fact remained as to whether the debtor suffered any
damages from the violation of the automatic stay. In re
A&J Auto Sales, Inc., 205 B.R. 676 (Bankr. D. N.H.
1996).
During the administration of the debtor’s Chapter 7
case, the IRS levied against securities owned by the
debtor and included in the bankruptcy estate. The IRS
was held to have violated the automatic stay and was
ordered to restore the assets or their value in cash to the
estate. The court also held that, because the assets were
to be returned to the estate and not the debtor, the debtor
did not suffer any injury and no damages were awarded.
In re Weisberger, 205 B.R. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1997).
DISCHARGE. The debtor owed taxes for 1985-
1988. The debtor did not file the returns for those years
until after the IRS had made an assessment based on
substitute returns constructed by the IRS. The debtor’s
returns used the figures from the substitute returns. The
IRS argued that the discharge of taxes provision under
Section 523(a)(1)(B) did not apply because the IRS had
made an assessment and constructed substitute returns
prior to the debtor’s filing of the tax returns. The court
held that Section 523(a)(1)(B) had no exception for
returns filed after assessment. In addition, the court held
that the returns were valid and were not affected by the
substitute returns constructed by the IRS. In re
Hindenlang, 205 B.R. 874 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997).
The debtor filed for Chapter 7 in February 1987. The
debtor filed the 1987 tax return in October 1989 under
an IRS-granted extension.  The IRS made an assessment
for the 1987 taxes in December 1989. The debtor
received a discharge in that case in May 1993. The
debtor filed a second Chapter 7 case in August 1995.
The court acknowledge the weight of precedent in
several Circuit Courts of Appeal that held that a
bankruptcy case tolls the three year period of Section
507(a)(8)(A)(i), but held with the minority that
bankruptcy cases do not toll the three year period for
discharge of taxes with filed returns. The court,
however, denied the debtor summary judgment on the
issue because there remained issues of fact as to whether
the IRS was entitled to equitable relief because of debtor
misconduct or abuse of the bankruptcy process. In re
Nolan, 205 B.R. 885 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1997).
The debtor had owned a company and transferred
ownership of the company to a trust which then
transferred company stock to an off-shore corporation
with the intent to hide from the IRS the assets and their
sales. The court found that the transactions were shams
with no economic purpose except to obtain tax
avoidance; therefore, the taxes owed on the debtor’s
income from the company and sales of company assets
were nondischargeable. The court also reached the same
conclusion based on income tax returns filed by the
debtor which did not include the income from the
company and asset sales. In re Sommers, 97-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,359 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997).
CONTRACTS
BOARS. The plaintiff purchased seven boars from
the defendant for the purpose of breeding the plaintiff’s
gilts. The baby pigs born had shaker pig syndrome, also
known as congenital tremors. The plaintiff brought suit
for breach of express and implied warranties, negligent
misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation. The
sales contract contained language recognizing that
congenital tremors could exist in the purchased boars
and limited the defendant’s liability to the replacement
of the boars or the refund of the purchase price. The
plaintiff argued that the contract was unconscionable
because the warranties were illusory since the
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warranties amounted to only a sale “as is” which would
be unacceptable to any buyer. The court held that the
warranty limitation language was clear and
unambiguous and that the contract was not
unconscionable because the plaintiff failed to show any
unfair bargaining advantage held by the defendant or
excess pressure exerted on the plaintiff to agree to the
language. The court noted that the limited warranty
language was conspicuous and that the boars did
conform to the contract provisions. The plaintiff also
argued that the contract was invalid in that the remedies
allowed for breach of the contract by the defendant had
no relation to the possible damages that could result
from a breach, as in this case where over 100 baby pigs
were lost. The court held that the defendant’s liability
allowed by the contract was sufficient in that it would
compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the goods
involved in the contract. The court granted summary
judgment for the defendant on the issue of negligent
misrepresentation because the contract did not involve
the supplying of information but involved only the sale
of goods. The court also granted summary judgment on
the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation because the
contract explicitly acknowledged that the boars could
have the congenital tremors virus, which was
undetectable by testing. Brunsman v. DeKalb Swine




CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has issued
proposed regulations which include the macadamia nut
Endorsement in the Common Crop Insurance Policy and
restrict the endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier
crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 19063 (April 18, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the macadamia nut tree Endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years.
62 Fed. Reg. 19067 (April 18, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the potato Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions
to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 19691
(April 23, 1997).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which
include the walnut Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions




INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX.
The decedent’s estate included an interest in a closely-
held business, the value of which exceeded 95 percent
of the decedent’s gross estate. The estate elected to pay
the estate tax in installments. The estate had also
claimed a credit for a prior transfer of property from a
decedent which was denied by the IRS. The estate
brought an action in the Tax Court to determine whether
the credit was proper. During the case, the estate made
installment payments based on deductions of interest
which accrued on the installments, as allowed by Rev.
Proc. 81-27, 1981-2 C.B. 547. The case is not clear on
this point, but the estate apparently calculated the estate
tax without the disputed credit. However, the IRS
sought payments of the installments without the interest
deductions and eventually threatened to file a tax lien
for the disputed amount. The estate then paid the
amount demanded by the IRS and filed the current case
for a refund of the excess payments, although estate tax
installments were still due and the excess payments
would be applied to the future installments. The estate
argued that Rev. Proc. 81-27 allowed the deduction for
installment tax interest. The IRS claimed that it had a
policy of not allowing the interest deduction on
installments when the estate was involved in litigation
over the correct amount of estate tax owed. The IRS
claimed that to allow the Rev. Proc. 81-27 adjustments
would be too difficult for the IRS to coordinate among
the departments in the IRS involved with the Tax Court
case and administration of the estate’s account. The
court held that the IRS unpublished policy of
disallowing the interest adjustment during pending
litigation was reasonable in light of the nature of
revenue procedures as non-substantive law. The court
noted that the statute did not require or specifically
allow the interest adjustment.  Estate of Shapiro v.
Comm’r, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,267 (2d Cir.
1997).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent had received an interest in trust in timberland
from the decedent’s parent’s estate. The parent’s will
provided that the trust was not to distribute any trust
principal or income until all estate taxes were paid for
the parent’s estate. The parent’s estate elected
installment payment of the estate taxes. When the
decedent died, there were 14 years left for payment of
the estate tax installments and no income or principal
had been distributed. The decedent’s will created a trust
for the surviving spouse and transferred all property in
the decedent’s estate to the trust. The surviving spouse’s
trust provided that the trustee could not sell any interests
in timberland, thus preventing the trustee from
converting the trust’s interest in the decedent’s share of
the parent’s trust to income producing property. The
IRS ruled that the surviving spouse’s trust was not
eligible for the marital deduction because the surviving
spouse would not receive all the income from the trust
assets. Ltr. Rul. 9717005, Dec. 18, 1996.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. The decedent had
purchased 19 separate annuities listing the decedent as
annuitant and naming the contingent beneficiaries. The
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decedent had named three persons as contingent
beneficiaries of three of the annuities. These three
persons also held joint power of attorney over the
decedent’s assets. The power included the same power
to convey the decedent’s property as held by the
decedent. The three persons then executed gifts of the
annuities to the contingent benefit holders, including
themselves. The court found that the decedent had
intended to make these gifts and that the power to
convey the decedent’s property included the power to
donate the property. The court focused on the facts that
the decedent intended to make the gifts and that the
power of attorney did not exclude the making of gifts;
therefore, the court held that the gifts were completed
prior to the decedent’s death and were not included in
the decedent’s gross estate. Estate of Neff v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1997-186.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that revised
Form 706, United States Estate (and Generation-
Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, and instructions has
been issued and is available from the IRS at 1-800-829-
3676 or at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].*
The U.S. Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the
following case: The decedent died on December 15,
1995 owning farm property. The decedent’s estate
attempted to make a special use valuation election on
the estate’s timely filed estate tax return. However, the
executor failed to fill in the “yes” box after the question
on the form asking if a special use valuation was elected
and the return failed to include the recapture agreement
of the qualified heirs. The IRS notified the estate that
the election was incomplete and the estate supplied the
recapture agreement within 90 days after the IRS
notification. The IRS denied the election because the
initial return did not substantially comply with the
election requirements. The court held that the recapture
agreement was an essential element of the election and
the estate return did not substantially comply with the
election; therefore, the estate was not entitled, under
I.R.C. § 2032A(d)(3), to perfect the election. The estate
also argued that Section 1421 of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 allowed the perfection of the election because the
original estate tax return provided “substantially all the
information” for the election. The court held that the
recapture agreement was an essential part of the
“information” required by Section 1421 and the failure
to provide the agreement prevented the estate from
perfecting the election after notice by the IRS. Estate of
Lucas v. United States, 97 F.3d 1401 (11th Cir. 1996).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
The decedent had owned stock but entered into an
agreement to sell the stock to an unrelated party for 10
years. The stock was exchanged for an interest bearing
note for $2 million. At the end of the ten years, the
decedent’s children had an option to repurchase the
shares for $1.00. The court found that the value of the
shares on the option date would be about $1.8 million.
Thus, the total consideration for the use of the stock for
10 years was $3.8 million and the court found that the
value of the use of the stock for 10 years was $3.2
million. The court held that the decedent had received
adequate consideration for the stock and the stock was
not included in the decedent’s estate. The court also
held that the decedent did not retain any interest in the
stock to cause the stock to be included in the gross
estate. Estate of Brown v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1997-195.
TRUSTS. The IRS has issued a revenue procedure
stating that the IRS will not issue letter rulings
concerning charitable unitrusts as to this issue: Whether
a trust qualifies as a charitable unitrust when a grantor,
trustee, beneficiary or a person related to any of these
persons can control the timing of the trust’s receipt of
income from a partnership or a deferred annuity contract
to take advantage of the difference between trust income
under I.R.C. § 643(b) and income for federal income tax
purposes for the benefit of the unitrust recipient. Rev.
Proc. 97-23, I.R.B. 1997-__.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations amending
I.R.C. §§ 664 and 2702, concerning charitable
remainder trusts. The proposed amendments contain
rules on the conditions under which the governing
instrument may provide for a change in the method of
calculating the unitrust amount, the date by which the
annuity amount or the unitrust amount under the fixed
percentage method must be paid to the recipient, who is
required to value unmarketable assets, and when I.R.C.
§ 2702 applies to certain charitable remainder unitrusts.
The proposed regulations clarify existing law that
prohibits allocating precontribution capital gains to trust
income. The proposed amendments also contain an
example illustrating how the ordering rule of I.R.C. §
664(b) applies to distributions from a charitable
remainder unitrust using an income exception method to
calculate the unitrust amount. 62 Fed. Reg. 19072
(April 18, 1997).
VALUATION . The decedent had owned a 75
percent undivided interest in timberland held for the
production of timber for harvest as lumber. In 1987, the
decedent gave 25 percent of the interests in the
timberland to three children, with each child receiving
an 8.33 percent undivided interest in the land. After the
gifts, each child owned a total of 16.67 percent
undivided interest in the land. The issue was the value
of the 25 percent interest transferred. The court held that
the method of valuation to be used was the income
capitalization method, because a purchaser/owner of the
interests could obtain a partition of the land. The court
reasoned that during the pendency of the partition
action, the owner would receive the income from the
property and would incur litigation costs. At the end of
the action, the owner would receive either a portion of
the land in fee simple or cash equivalent to the value of
the separate interest. The court held that a discount rate
of 10 percent was applicable. The court then determined
the amount of income from the property for each year of
a four year partition process, less a prorated level of
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costs of the partition action for each year, with the net
income discounted at 10 percent per year.  Estate of
Barge v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-188.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned a 26 acre
tract of land. The land was divided into an 18 acre
parcel which was leased to an unrelated party for
farming. The remaining eight acres were used for the
family residence and included a house, barn, storage
buildings and a garage. The zoning ordinance for the
property required all residential and agricultural parcels
to be at least five acres in size. The taxpayers transferred
the residential parcel to a seven year trust for the
taxpayers, with the provisions designed to meet the
requirements of a qualified personal residence trust
under I.R.C. § 2702(a)(3)(A)(ii). The IRS ruled that the
entire eight acre residential parcel trust was a qualified
residence trust because the property could not be further
divided under the local zoning ordinance. Ltr. Rul.
9717017, Jan. 22, 1997.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES . The taxpayer was a
corporation which owned a building used by one of it’s
subsidiaries. The building was remodeled and as part of
that remodeling, asbestos containing materials were
removed. The court held that the costs of the asbestos
removal had to be capitalized because they were part of
the general plan of renovation of the building. Norwest
Corp. v. Comm’r, 108 T.C. No. 15 (1997).
CASUALTY LOSSES. The President has declared
certain areas of (1) Tennessee as disaster areas from
March 18, 1997 storms; (2) Washington as disaster
areas from mud slides and flooding beginning on March
18, 1997; (3) South Dakota as disaster areas from
storms and flooding beginning on Feb. 3, 1997; (4)
North Dakota as disaster areas from storms and flooding
beginning on Feb. 28, 1997; (5) Minnesota as disaster
areas from storms and flooding beginning on March 21,
1997; and (6) Arkansas as disaster areas from storms
and flooding beginning on April 4, 1997. Losses from
these casualties may be deducted in taxpayers’ 1996
returns.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.*  The taxpayer
was a taxable farmers’ cooperative which issued annual
dividends in part by qualified written notices of
allocation of the cooperative’s taxable profit. The
cooperative’s patrons included the amounts in the
notices in their taxable income. When a patron
terminated a membership, the cooperative redeemed the
notices held by the patron at a discounted amount. The
IRS argued that, under the tax benefit rule, the
difference between the face value of the notices and the
amounts actually paid to terminated patrons were
taxable income to the cooperative. The Tax Court
acknowledged that the cooperative tax laws were based
on a “one level” taxation, either at the cooperative level
or at the patron level and that the patrons were deemed
to have constructively received the amounts in the
written notices of allocation. However, the Tax Court
agreed with the IRS that the discounting of the
redemption amount carried back that amount to increase
the original taxable income; therefore, the tax benefit
rule applied to include the discounted amount in the
cooperative's taxable income. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the amount of discount applied to
the termination payments was not subject to the tax
benefit rule. The court reasoned that the taxation scheme
for qualified written notices considered the notices to be
the actual payment of income to the patron and taxed as
such. The notices then changed the form of the patron’s
involvement with the cooperative as to the notice
amount to an investment in the cooperative; therefore,
the payment of the notice amount at termination was a
repayment of investment and not income and did not
reinstate income to the cooperative so as to invoke the
tax benefit rule. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Comm’r, 97-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,365 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’g, 104
T.C. 696 (1995).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
PARTNERSHIP LOSSES. The taxpayer had
invested in a tax shelter. In separate Tax Court
proceedings, the court held that certain items of profit
and loss were not available to the partnership because of
a lack of a bona fide business purpose to the tax shelter
transactions. The taxpayer sought to include the
taxpayer’s share of those items of income and loss in the
taxpayer’s personal income tax return, arguing that the
taxpayer’s investment in the partnership was made with
a profit motive. The court held that the determination at
the partnership level prevented the taxpayer’s use of the
disallowed partnership income and loss items. Helton v.
United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,364 (D.
Alaska 1997).
TAX LIENS.  The taxpayer was a corporation which
was a general partner in a partnership. The IRS had
made assessments for taxes against the partnership but
not against the taxpayer. The IRS argued that, because a
general partner is liable for partnership debts, the
assessment was valid against the taxpayer as a general
partner. The court held that a tax lien was not valid
where the taxpayer did not receive separate assessment.
The IRS had also failed to issue a separate notice and
demand against the taxpayer for taxes owed by the
partnership. The court held that a tax lien was not
created against the taxpayer because the taxpayer did
not receive separate notice and demand. El Paso
Refining, Inc. v. IRS, 205 B.R. 497 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The debtor owned a
residence which became part of the bankruptcy estate
except for a $10,000 exemption. The residence was sold
by the trustee for a substantial amount of taxable gain.
The trustee sought permission to exclude the gain under
the one time exclusion allowed under I.R.C. § 121
because the debtor was over the age of 55. The trustee
first argued that the bankruptcy estate was similar to a
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decedent’s estate and the exclusion was allowed under
Rev. Rul. 82-1. The court held that the analogy was not
appropriate in that a decedent’s estate acts in the place
of the decedent and only one income tax return is filed;
whereas, under a bankruptcy case, both the estate and
the debtor file separate returns. The trustee argued that
the eligibility for the exclusion passed from the debtor
to the estate under I.R.C. § 1398(g). The court held that
there was no provision in Section 1398 for transfer of
the gain exclusion right to the estate. In re Barden, 205
B.R. 453 (E.D. N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,244 (2d Cir. 1997).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
May 1997
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.23 6.14 6.09 6.06
110% AFR 6.86 6.75 6.69 6.66
120% AFR 7.51 7.37 7.30 7.26
Mid-term
AFR 6.85 6.74 6.68 6.65
110% AFR 7.55 7.41 7.34 7.30
120% AFR 8.25 8.09 8.01 7.96
Long-term
AFR 7.18 7.06 7.00 6.96
110% AFR 7.92 7.77 7.70 7.65
120% AFR 8.65 8.47 8.38 8.32
TRAVEL EXPENSES. The taxpayer was an
employee of a company which required the taxpayer to
drive to clients for company business. The taxpayer
submitted records to the company of the mileage used
for company business for reimbursement of some costs
of the use of the vehicle. The taxpayer did not keep
records of the personal use of the vehicle. The IRS
allowed a travel deduction only for the miles claimed in
the report, based on the standard mileage rate, reduced
by the amount of reimbursement received from the
company. The taxpayer had claimed other vehicle
expenses, including auto insurance, based on a 95
percent business use of the vehicle. The court held that
the IRS determination was correct because the taxpayer
failed to substantiate that the vehicle was used 95
percent for business. Kelly v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1997-185.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a nurse anesthetist and
formed a trust to receive a share in a partnership which
had another anesthetist as a partner. Although the
taxpayer performed the medical services, the amounts
distributed by the partnership were placed in the trust’s
bank account. The taxpayer, however, had control over
the funds in the partnership and had control over the
trust bank account. The trust did not file income tax
returns or pay any tax on the partnership distributions.
The court held that the taxpayer was liable for the tax on
the partnership distributions because the amounts were
paid to the taxpayer, the taxpayer had control over the
funds at all times, and the amounts resulted from the
services provided to the partnership by the taxpayer.
Estrada v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-180.
NEGLIGENCE
SPREAD OF PLANT VIRUS. The parties in this
case were neighboring farmers. The plaintiff grew
wheat in one year but the defendant left a neighboring
field lie fallow and volunteer wheat grew on the land.
The evidence showed that a source of wheat streak
mosaic virus is volunteer wheat because no control of
the virus is attempted. The plaintiff sued the defendant
in negligence for failing to take steps to control the virus
on the volunteer wheat. The court upheld a trial court
ruling of summary judgment for the defendant, holding
that there was no statutory, regulatory or common law
duty to control a virus to prevent spread of the virus to a
neighbor’s fields.  Krug v. Koriel, __ P.2d __ (Kan.
Ct. App. 1997).
NUISANCE
DRAINS. The plaintiff was a cranberry farmer and
the plaintiff’s cranberry bogs relied for drainage on
ponds on land owned by the defendant town. In one
crop year, the plaintiff discovered that the cranberry
bogs could not be drained because a drain for one of the
town’s ponds was blocked. The plaintiff requested that
the town unblock the drain and filed this case for
nuisance when the town refused to unblock the drain.
The court upheld a trial court’s ruling that the town’s
failure to unblock the pipe was unreasonable and
constituted a nuisance. Murphy v. Town of Chatham,
676 N.E.2d 473 (Mass. Ct. App. 1996).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
MILK. A corporation owned a chain of retail
grocery stores and also supplied other independent
stores with milk and other grocery items. The
corporation purchased raw milk which was processed by
independent processors for retail and wholesale sale by
the corporation. The corporation applied for a milk
dealer’s license  which was eventually granted by the
defendant state milk marketing board under a court
order. The plaintiff was an association of milk dealers
and challenged the grant of the milk dealer’s license to
the corporation, arguing that the corporation did not
qualify as a milk dealer because the corporation itself
did not produce or manufacture milk. The court noted
initially that the challenge to the dealer’s license would
fail because the issue was already litigated and resulted
in a court order to grant the license. In addition, the
court held that the statutory definition of milk dealer
included corporations which purchased milk for the
purposes of processing and sale, as the corporation did
in this case. The court held that the definition did not
require that the licensee actually do the processing or
manufacture itself. Pennsylvania Milk Dealers Ass’n






2d ANNUAL SEMINAR IN PARADISE
  
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 5-9, 1998
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy
trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand
beaches and the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a
world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business
Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.  The seminar is scheduled
for January 5-9, 1998 at the spectacular ocean-front
Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort on the Big Island,
Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.
each day, Monday through Friday, with a continental
breakfast and break refreshments included in the
registration fee.  Each participant will receive a copy of
Dr. Harl's 400 page seminar manual, Farm Estate and
Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be
updated just prior to the seminar.
     Here are the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year
installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts,
taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date,
special use valuation, handling life insurance, marital
deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize
tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping
transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with
future interests, handling estate freezes, and "hidden"
gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including
income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private
annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part
gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living
trusts.
   • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two,
corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
The Agricultural Law Press has made arrangements
for group discount air fares on United Airlines,
available through Sun Quest Vacations. In addition,
attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel
rooms at the Hilton Waikoloa Village Resort, the site
of the seminar. Early registration is important to obtain
the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient
flights at a busy travel time of the year.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current
subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest or the
Agricultural Law Manual. The registration fee for
nonsubscribers is $695.
Watch your mail for a registration packet or call













Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Installment payment of estate
tax 76
Marital deduction 76
Power of attorney 76
Returns 77












Sale of residence 78
Safe harbor interest rates
May 1997  79
 Travel expenses 79
Trusts 79
Negligence
Spread of plant virus 79
Nuisance
Drains 79
State Regulation of Agriculture
Milk 79
